Abstract-The three stages complete information multi-players dynamic game between visitors, local governments and parks managers is proposed in this paper to solve the significant problem about the investment on the visitor education. The game reveals that the government should set up induction fund to lead the parks and tourism companies invest money on visitor education before the Nash Equilibrium state of the game is reached. The win-win-win situation of the government, parks and visitors can be obtained when the positive interaction mechanism of government leading, tourism enterprise implementing and tourist participating is established.
INTRODUCTION
The number of domestic tourists reaches 2.9 billion in China in 2012.The negative impacts to the natural ecological environment is introduced by the enormous tourists quickly [1] . The tourism education activities are originated in America. In 1979, the wilderness specialist Jim Bradley proposed a tourism education programme to reduce the negative impacts to Nature Reserve areas [2] .In the 1990s, the related department of the United States and Non-Profit Organization designed and promoted a Leave No Trace [3] programme together. China also attaches importance to visitor education in fact. The contents, patterns and routes of visitor education has been studied and practiced fruitfully, but the complete theoretical system, practice pattern, dynamic mechanism, and share responsibility for the education cost are the bottleneck problems. In fact, visitor education intervention is a complex system, Wei,D. and Wen,S. proposed an ordinary differential equation and stochastic Dynamics to study the efficacy of the visitor education intervention [4, 5] .No all of the stakeholders are willing to input resources to visitor education because of their own benefit, because some tourism resources are not pure public goods. It is the three stages complete information multi-players dynamic game between visitors, local governments and parks managers [6] .
It is interesting to apply game theory to study the cost share of visitor education. 
MULTI-PLAYERS DYNAMIC GAME OF VISITOR EDUCATION
The first primary missions of visitor education is intervening the visitors' behaviors base on the aims of parks' management, hereinafter referred to as 'behaviors intervening'. The second primary missions is spreading or sharing knowledge of parks, hereinafter referred to as 'knowledge services'. The total cost of visitor education is ( ) u x e . Visitors can choose the participation level according their own need. However, there is negative utility for minority visitors when they reduce uncivilized behaviours. Hence, the utility function of visitors can be denoted as following
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where a is the ticket price of park. The visitors' satisfaction does not decrease when the ticket is priced at reasonable range, otherwise the satisfaction decreases. The tourist quantity increases when visitors' satisfaction increases. The function of tourist quantity can be described as following 1 2 (
Government collects t taxes on each ticket.
Government pays α percentages of the total cost of visitor education. Then the earnings of government is 
IV. SOLUTIONS
The Backwards Induction is the best method to solve the problem [6] 
It can be seen from Eq.(6) that visitors choose the optimal participation level * 1 x in the condition that marginal positive and negative utility of the behaviour intervention are equal. Eq. (7) indicates that visitors choose the optimal knowledge services participation level 
The park's optimal investment strategy on visitor education should satisfy that the marginal return of investment on the behaviour intervention equal to the marginal return of investment on the knowledge services.
Backward to the first stage of the game, the government should choose an optimal strategy as following (7),(8) and (9). And the win-win-win situation of the government, parks and visitors appears on the Nash Equilibrium state of the game. The triple sides gain the maximum benefit simultaneously.
V. CONCLUSIONS
When the visitor education system in the tourism market does not established and there are no other external factors to push the establishment, visitor education can only gain the equilibrium in lower level. In that case, the government should set up induction fund to lead the parks and tourism companies invest money on visitor education, because financial fund has the leverage and amplification effect. When visitor education develops to a certain stage with the help of government induction fund, it can run autonomously without the external factors. And the Game 
